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Abstract 
China has introduced several pilot emission trading schemes to build the basis for a national 
scheme. The potential scale of this initiative raises prospects for a regional carbon trading 
network as a way to further engage other major Asian economies. However, the Chinese 
carbon markets rest upon a unique political-economic context and institutional environment 
that are likely to limit their development and viability. This article offers an overview of such 
structural economic and political constraints. Four main challenges are identified, namely, 
inadequate domestic demand, limited financial involvement, incomplete regulatory 
infrastructure, and excessive government intervention. The first two challenges concern 
economic dimensions and may be partially addressed by the incentives created by the newly 
introduced emission trading schemes. The other two are more deeply entrenched in the 
dominant political system and governing practice. They require fundamental changes to the 
ways in which the state and the market interact. The success of China’s carbon market reform 
depends crucially on the ability of the ongoing efforts to transform the distorted state-market 
relationship.  
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Introduction 
Over the past decade, carbon emission markets have risen to become the dominant form of 
institutions for climate change mitigation (Ellerman, Convery, & Perthuis, 2010; Grubb, 
2012; Grubb, Laing, Counsell, & Willan, 2011; Mol, 2012; Pezzey & Jotzo, 2013; 
Spaargaren & Mol, 2013). Global carbon trades recorded a soaring market value of US$176 
billion in 2011 (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012, p. 10). Approximately US$23 billion originated 
from the trading of secondary carbon offsets under the Kyoto Protocol’s market mechanisms, 
notably the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  
Global carbon finance needs to be scaled up by an order of magnitude in the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Some commentators see opportunities from 
outside the project-based CDM. Allowance-based market mechanisms may be able to engage 
emerging economies in ways similar to those which operate in Europe, i.e. the European 
Union’s (EU) emission trading scheme (ETS) (Grubb, 2012; Perdan & Azapagic, 2011). 
Major Asian economies are taking up this trend, including Tokyo (Japan), South Korea, 
China, Kazakhstan, and India. China, the world’s largest emerging market, is seen to have 
great potential for large-scale carbon trading (Fankhauser, 2011; Guan & Hubacek, 2010; 
Jotzo, De Boer, & Kater, 2013; Wang, 2013). 
China declared a plan to introduce ETSs in the late 2011, raising prospects for further 
engagement with other major Asian economies through a regional carbon trading network. 
Seven pilot ETSs have come to operation in the country since 2013 (Han, Olsson, Hallding, 
& Lunsford, 2012; Jotzo, 2013; Lo, 2012). The short-term goal is to establish trans-
provincial and trans-regional ETSs in transition to a national ETS. The prospective national 
scheme may eventually become the world’s second largest after the EU ETS and mark a 
major step forward in creating a global carbon market at a potentially higher value than the 
oil market. This has brought some hope to advocates of a common carbon price across the 
globe. 
From the Chinese government’s perspective emission trading has multiple benefits. 
According to Wang and Duan (2013), both officially involved in the design of China’s ETSs, 
the emission trading programme can, on the micro-economic level, help minimize the costs 
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of GHG emission reduction, develop new business opportunities, promote business 
engagement, and establish links with international carbon markets. At a macro-economic 
level, a successful national ETS will contribute to the transformation to a low-carbon 
economy and strengthen China’s role in international climate change negotiations 
(Partnership for Market Readiness, 2013; Sun, 2012).  
However, China’s carbon pricing policies have been developed in a different 
political-economic context. The majority of the existing mandatory ETSs operate in mature 
market economies safeguarded by a liberal democratic regime. In contrast, China is a 
developing market economy with socialist political legacies (Lo, 2010; Tsang & Kolk, 2010). 
Also it currently does not assume any binding commitment to absolute emissions reduction. 
These political realities have created considerable institutional barriers to the development of 
domestic carbon markets in China.   
This article offers an overview of such structural economic and political constraints, 
and discusses the main challenges to the development of carbon markets in China. It is based 
on an extensive review of official policy documents, published research papers, and relevant 
news reports. The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. The first one 
describes the context of carbon trading, followed by an elaboration on the national policy 
context in which China’s carbon market and pilot ETSs are situated. The third explains the 
structural hurdles to the development of domestic carbon markets. Implications are discussed 
in the conclusion. 
 
2.  The political-economic context of carbon trading 
The EU ETS is the world’s largest carbon market, which is worth US$148 billion and has 
entered Phase III (2013-2020) of its implementation. Outside Europe, progress has also been 
made in the Anglo-American world, with ETSs emerging in New Zealand, Australia, 
California and ten Northeastern states of the U.S., British Columbia and Quebec (Canada). 
Carbon markets have become popular because they have enabled the formation of business 
alliances favouring GHG emissions reductions and enabled businesses to imagine a cycle of 
investments, profits, and growth centered on these markets. These markets offer a new 
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avenue for economic growth operating by re-organising the role and power of the state 
(Bumpus & Liverman, 2008; Newell & Paterson, 2010). 
It is widely believed that carbon markets are established in the liberal-capitalist world 
as a product of a coalition of financial, political, and environmental actors (Bumpus and 
Liverman 2008; Paterson 2010, 2012). The political momentum for carbon trading was 
driven by government bodies forming powerful allies with major industries. In particular, 
some transnational oil giants and the financial sector formed advocacy groups and 
significantly influenced governments’ decisions to introduce ETSs in Europe and the U.S. 
(Meckling, 2011; Newell and Paterson 2010). The advocacy coalition manifested as a 
bottom-up force driving the process of market construction (Meckling, 2011; Paterson, 2010, 
2012). Compatible norms of liberal market economic are pivotal to the market success. 
 The broader political economic context within which China’s carbon markets gain 
force varies from those of the established liberal-capitalist regimes. The country does not 
have a long history of neoliberalization of environmental policy and the state machinery is 
not designed to run market mechanisms (Gilley, 2012; Lo, 2013). China has formally 
embraced the notion of “socialist market economy” since its 14th National Congress held in 
1992. The post-Mao market reforms have seen the state retaining substantial control over 
critical industries, commodity markets, and the economy generally. Political power is largely 
centralized, particularly in the formulation of national climate change policies, whereas the 
influence of non-state actors remains peripheral. The authoritative governing practice could 
undermine the capacity of decentralised economic and market institutions to support the use 
of market-based policy instruments for mitigating environmental impacts.  
 The concentration of state power indicates a notable departure from the view that 
carbon markets are primarily powered by a finance-led coalition. This raises questions about 
how the Chinese domestic carbon markets operate in such a different context and what 
challenges constrain their further development. An overview of relevant policy background 
could help address these questions. 
 
3.  China’s climate policy and recent development 
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3.1 Towards a market-based approach 
China has risen to the world’s second largest economy and the largest national source of 
GHGs, producing 25.4 per cent of the world’s total CO2 emissions, or 5.9 tonnes CO2 per 
capita in 2011 (International Energy Agency, 2013: 52 and 103). At the 2009 United Nations 
Summit on Climate Change, the then Chinese President Hu Jintao indicated that China will 
not accept mandatory national targets for emission reduction until major developed countries 
take the lead. Later, at the Copenhagen conference, the Chinese delegate reportedly 
attempted to block the development of the Copenhagen Accord (Christoff, 2010). China was 
blamed for failing to assume tougher emission reduction targets and for not working in 
meaningful ways with the international community.  
Nonetheless, China has made some progress back home (Jiang, Zhuang, Miao, & He, 
2013; Zhang, 2007, 2011). As the world’s leader in renewable energy production (Schroeder, 
2009), carbon intensity has declined over the last two decades, although this came with rapid 
growth in CO2 emissions per capita (Figure 1). Prior to the Copenhagen negotiations, the 
country substantially scaled up its unilateral commitment: carbon intensity down by 40-45 
per cent below 2005 levels by 2020. Official climate change policy programmes have been 
put in place since the second half of 2000s. In 2007, China launched the National Climate 
Change Program (National Development and Reform Commission, 2007). In 2008, the 
White Paper on China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change was released 
(State Council, 2008).  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
China’s climate policy regime indicates two key features that influence the 
development of domestic carbon markets. Firstly, economic interests are deeply embedded 
into the climate policy framework – more so than in other major developed countries. The 
2007 and 2008 policy documents are essentially an energy blueprint and none of them make 
reference to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), the national environmental 
agency, or its predecessor (Lo, 2010). Climate change policies are formulated and 
implemented by the NDRC, which is a macroeconomic planning and management agency 
under the State Council (commonly known as the ‘central government’). The NDRC is a 
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more powerful administrative body, with its own energy and environmental departments, 
than the MEP. It is worthwhile noting that the NDRC is a co-chair of the National CDM 
Board of China, whereas the MEP is only a board member. The dominant role of the NDRC 
indicates the strategic position of climate policy as being situated in the context of energy 
security and conservation (Lo, 2010; Tsang and Kolk, 2010). Climate change impacts are 
understood primarily in macro-economic terms (Sautter, 2009).  
Second, China remains a planned economy in some aspects, despite the tendency of 
decentralisation in environmental policy-making (Mol, 2009). Climate change is treated as a 
technical issue by political elites and state administrators, for which technical fixes are 
concentrated on energy saving measures and introduced in a top-down fashion (Lo, 2010; 
Tsang and Kolk, 2010). Centrally planned policy guidelines are published in a periodic 
legislative document known as the ‘Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development’ (FYP). FYPs prescribe national economic and social directions and coordinate 
policy priorities. FYPs are the most prominent strategic blueprint for the country. Climate 
change was not written into any FYP until the 11th FYP which covered the period of 2006-
2010. Specifying mandatory targets is a key feature of FYPs and the 11th FYP addressed 
climate change by declaring commitment to an energy intensity target, i.e. 20 per cent 
reduction by 2010. Throughout this period, GHG control in China was achieved largely 
through direct regulation. A range of administrative and political measures were deployed, 
including government-funded incentives to support installation of energy-saving equipment, 
top-down imposition of energy-saving targets on energy-intensive industries, and forced 
closure of inefficient power plants and factories. Market-based instruments were used to play 
a limited role. 
Although China’s institutional innovations have produced positive environmental 
outcomes, they have not contributed to absolute reductions in emissions and energy use (Mol, 
2009). Success has been achieved only in relative terms: between 2000 and 2011, China’s 
carbon intensity (CO2 emissions per unit GDP) dropped by 19 per cent, but the level of CO2 
emissions more than doubled (140 per cent) (International Energy Agency, 2013: 97 and 52, 
respectively). The 11th FYP received marginal success against the emission reduction target. 
China managed to lower energy intensity by 19.06 per cent by the end of 2010. This result, 
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however, involved an extended use of the ‘visible hand’, i.e. political intervention, such as 
electricity rationing (Wu, 2011), and formal coercive requirements on energy consumption 
(Gilley, 2012). As part of last-ditch efforts to meet the target, a number of provinces were 
forced to close large swathes of industrial capacity, resulting in “black-outs” of some 
industries and certain cities towards the end of 2010 (Gilley, 2012; Han et al., 2012). The 
marginal success came with high costs.  
This experience prompted the central government to seek a different strategy. 
Economic policy instruments immediately received attention from senior government 
officials. Carbon taxes and cap-and-trade mechanisms are prime examples of these 
instruments being put under serious consideration by the central government.  
 
3.2 Tax or trading? Or both? 
Carbon trading entered an uncertain period in 2009, when the world economy stumbled and 
the Copenhagen Conference failed to produce substantive agreements on Post-2012 
commitments (Perdan and Azapagic, 2011). As the world economy began to recover from 
the financial turmoil, China cast a vote of confidence for the carbon market. Towards the end 
of 2010, senior Chinese officials declared their ambition to establish a national ETS to curtail 
its growing GHG output. In October 2011, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planning agency, granted official approval to 
seven carbon trading pilot projects.  
However, carbon taxes were actually the first preference (Wu, 2011; Han et al., 2012; 
Yu and Elsworth, 2012). Carbon taxation was listed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) as a 
promising carbon pricing approach as early as 2007, and several peak government agencies 
and research institutions were brought together to undertake preliminary research into its 
feasibility. This policy approach received support from a group of prominent government 
members and academic economists as a practical option for China in the early stages of its 
transition to a low-carbon economy in advance of a national ETS (Fan et al., 2011: 40). A 
new proposal for a Chinese carbon tax was submitted to the MOF for official consideration 
in the early 2012, with hopes to roll it out in the second half of the 12th FYP period, which 
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covers the period of 2011-2015 (Lin & Yang, 2012). It is worth noting that the carbon tax 
project is principally coordinated by the MEP, the MOF and other finance agencies, whose 
influences in the country’s climate policy regime are modest. 
Carbon taxes are a fiscal measure that harnesses market forces for controlling carbon 
pollution in ways opposite to carbon trading. Carbon taxes involve setting a fixed price for 
carbon emissions and allowing the quantity of emissions to fluctuate, whereas carbon trading 
involves a fixed quantity of emissions and allowing the price of carbon emissions to fluctuate.  
Cap-and-trade mechanisms produce efficient outcomes by allowing the market to determine 
the right price, and are therefore incompatible with carbon taxes which preclude carbon 
prices from changing. The Chinese government has a choice between the two economic 
instruments. 
Pezzey and Jotzo (2013) argue that carbon taxes are a fiscally attractive option for 
China provided that certain conditions are met. Others, such as Fan et al (2011) and Lin and 
Yang (2012), believe that the two policy instruments can co-exist in a given period of time. 
While it is possible in theory for carbon taxes and carbon trading to co-exist in a policy mix 
(Sorrell & Sijm, 2003), their potential conflicts should not be under-estimated. Carbon taxes, 
however, are primarily a domestic policy measure restricted to the implementing country. 
Such mechanisms could not support China’s growing desires for engaging in international or 
regional climate change policy regimes, such as the EU ETS or potentially its Asia-Pacific 
equivalent. In contrast, trading mechanisms allow international linking and can enhance the 
scale of domestic carbon markets and China’s capacity for engaging in the governance of 
international carbon markets. Carbon trading has greater global political and economic 
implications and therefore proven to be a preferred option being given higher political 
priority than the idea of carbon tax, which has only received scholarly appreciation and 
ministerial consideration.  
The political preference for ETS is evident in the 12th FYP. Although the government 
promises an annual GDP growth of 7 per cent under the 12th FYP period, it assumes ever 
greater environmental commitments than under any previous FYP. Prominent targets include 
an energy intensity reduction of 16 per cent and carbon intensity reduction of 17 per cent by 
2015 – the first time when a CO2 emission control target is written into a FYP. Carbon 
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trading has also found its way onto the official agenda. Confirmation comes from a brief 
statement in the 12th FYP that the country will embark on the building of domestic carbon 
markets (State Council, 2011a: Chapter 21). This commitment is official and granted at the 
highest level. More details were provided later in the thematic FYP on GHG control released 
by the State Council (2011c) reiterating the commitment to domestic carbon trading. The 
political endorsement articulated in these FYPs is authoritative, giving impetus to a top-down 
approach by which the market construction project proceeds.      
A formal notice of implementation outlining the Chinese ETS program was released 
in October 2011 by the NDRC (2011). The brief document states that, adherent to the master 
plan of the Community Party and the State Council (i.e. the 12th FYPs), the NDRC will 
gradually create a domestic carbon trading market (National Development and Reform 
Commission, 2011). The announcements by the State Council and the NDRC, its economic 
arm, have not only confirmed the political priority of establishing a compliance carbon 
market, but also painted a clearer picture by appointing seven pilot sites across the country, 
including two provinces (Guangdong and Hubei) and five cities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, 
Chongqing, and Shenzhen) (Table 1). Five of these pilot schemes commenced in 2013 and 
the remaining two (Chongqing and Hubei) were scheduled for 2014. Recorded carbon prices 
varied across these sites – from RMB26.96 (USD4.31) in Tianjin to RMB67.27 (USD10.75) 
in Shenzhen, but market transactions, by volume of treading, were concentrated in in the 
southern region (i.e. Guangdong, Shenzhen, and Shanghai) (Wang, 2014). The short-term 
goal of this policy programme is to establish trans-provincial and trans-regional ETS in 
transition to a national scheme. The timeframe for the national ETS has moved from 
2015/2016 to 2018 (S. Wang, 2014).  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]  
However, China’s climate change policies, including the prospective national ETS, 
are formulated in the context of continuing economic development. Although considerable 
political efforts are being organised to put a price on carbon, the overriding desire for 
economic growth and the interventionist planning tradition have created practical obstacles to 
China’s success on the carbon trading front. These challenges are explained in the next 
section.  
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 4. Structural constraints on the development of domestic carbon market  
‘Cap and trade’ mechanisms are driven by formal regulations and/or voluntary business 
commitments. In addition, they require a robust regulatory and legal framework and a liberal 
market economy to produce efficient outcomes. The Chinese carbon market falls short of the 
basic requirements and fails to play a functional role. The Chinese experience is 
characterised by inadequate domestic demand, limited financial involvement, incomplete 
regulatory infrastructure, and excessive government intervention. 
 
4.1 Inadequate domestic demand 
Adequate market demand is essential when building a functioning carbon market. It can be 
driven by a binding emission cap which puts a limit on the amount of GHG emissions that 
firms are allowed produce, or by their own voluntary commitment to cutting emissions. Such 
an absolute emission cap has not been introduced in China, while the market demand driven 
by current carbon intensity reduction targets is not strong enough to support the new industry.      
Since China is not subject to legally binding emission targets under the Kyoto 
Protocol, the central government lacks motivatation to cap GHG emissions at a national level. 
The absence of emission caps has created weak demand for emission allowances or offsets 
(Han et al., 2012; Yu & Elsworth, 2012). Domestic carbon trades have been predominantly 
driven by voluntary commitments. However, Chinese firms are under no obligation to hold 
carbon emissions credits for the pollution they produce, except for those now being covered 
by the pilot ETSs, which are by no means driven by any Kyoto-based emission target. Not 
many Chinese firms are motivated to purchase emission reduction credits to fulfil their 
corporate social responsibility and the majority lack motivation to act (Huang, 2013). The 
lack of expertise and capacity has also discouraged corporate participation in global carbon 
trading (Wang & Pan, 2009). 
 China is a net exporter of emission reduction credits. Under the Kyoto Protocol, 
Annex I countries could fulfil part of their compliance requirement by buying certified 
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emission reductions (CERs) from non-Annex I countries through the CDM. China is the 
biggest supplier of CERs in the CDM market. In the absence of strong domestic demand, the 
majority of the emission reductions produced are sold to international buyers (Han et al., 
2012; Xinhua News Agency, 2011). Besides CDM-driven activities, domestic deals are fairly 
limited.   
Ironically, the paucity of domestic carbon trades does not prevent the rapid expansion 
of carbon markets in the country. Carbon trading facilities in China have proliferated since 
2008. This is an exponential quantitative growth coupled with over-investments in trading 
infrastructure at the sub-national levels. At least 42 formal environment/carbon exchanges 
have been set up in various coastal and inland provinces, and even counties (AUTHORS, 
2013). Most of these exchanges focus on the flourishing carbon trading business. A growing 
number of carbon trading facilities and local ETSs are expected to come into operation 
within a short timeframe (Kossoy and Guigon, 2012; Xinhua News Agency, 2011). These 
numbers should be understood in the context of the European and American carbon markets 
in which only several exchanges handle most of the global carbon trades.  
The proliferation of carbon exchanges indicates the fragility of China’s carbon 
markets. The emergence of these exchanges is driven by an opportunistic attempt to engage 
in speculative activities and reap benefits for the local economy (Xinhua News Agency, 2011) 
– a modern ‘gold rush’. As noted by Liu (2010), carbon trading activities in China remain 
patchy and, until recently, there was no dedicated authority to coordinate these activities. 
There are more sellers than buyers in these markets due to weak domestic demand and strong 
incentives to sell emission reductions abroad. This is particularly true for smaller exchanges 
established in second- or even third-tier cities, where the lack of proper planning and 
coordination have resulted in intense competition among themselves for the already scarce 
supply of trading opportunities (AUTHORS, 2013). Reportedly, in the three years since its 
establishment, only three millions tonnes of carbon emissions were traded in the China 
Beijing Environment Exchange, the flagship carbon market located in the nation’s capital, 
falling short of the daily trading volume in Europe (China Business News, 2011). Marginal 
surplus is recorded only in Shanghai. Few transactions took place in its counterparts in 
Changsha and Shenzhen since their inception. Small local exchanges that have attracted 
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limited capital flows are doomed to premature closure (Xinhua News Agency, 2011). The 
scale and viability of individual carbon exchanges have been compromised by the weak 
domestic demand, a problem aggravated by their unchecked proliferation in the preceding 
years.  
Given the shortage of trading opportunities these carbon markets only play a 
peripheral role. They merely demonstrate the political efforts of local government leaders 
competing to showcase their achievements, and operate as a platform for organising public 
relations and research-and-development activities (Han et al., 2012).  These fragmented 
markets are not functioning, although they help build capacity for supporting major 
developments in the national carbon market. The absence of emissions caps has severely 
limited their vibrancy.  
 
4.2 Limited Involvement by Private Finance 
Commercial financial services are a critical element of a functioning and efficient carbon 
market (Bayon, Hawn, & Hamilton, 2009). In China, however, economic and financial 
institutions ‘have virtually no role to play in advancing environmental interests’ (Mol, 2006, 
p. 52). Mol (2006) suggests that these institutions feel no pressure or see any market 
opportunity from active engagement. This view accurately describes the current situation of 
climate finance and carbon trading in China specifically. 
According to the 2012 China Climate Finance Report, public funds currently 
dominate the total investment in climate finance in China (Wang et al., 2012; see The 
Climate Group, 2013 for a concise English version). In 2011, state-owned banks offered 
US$294 billion and direct government climate spending amounted to $US41 billion, whereas 
mainstream private sector investment, such as domestic and foreign bank loans, accounted 
for around US$10 billion (The Climate Group, 2013, p. 2). This shows that private funds are 
not the main source of climate finance in China. Existing systems have not been successful in 
directing private capital to the carbon financial markets. In contrast, private investment was 
the main source of climate mitigation finance globally (Grubb et al., 2011; Stadelmann, 
Michaelowa, & Roberts, 2013).  
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A number of structural problems have undermined the initial growth of the carbon 
financial industry in China. Firstly, the regulatory and policy systems are not conducive to 
the deployment of climate finance. Regulatory standards and official data on emissions are 
far from complete and consistent, making it difficult for financial institutions to assess the 
economic and environmental viability or risk of applications. The legal system remains 
incomplete and fragile. This raises the risk of financial frauds and gives little protection to 
investors in the event of financial breakdowns (The Climate Group, 2013; Wang, Liu, & 
Chen, 2012).  
Second, domestic financial institutions themselves lack both the incentive and 
capacity for participation. Motivation to finance emission mitigation is low as climate change 
is not seen as a fruitful investment option by domestic financiers. Although state-owned 
banks consider climate related investment as a corporate social responsibility issue, they are 
yet to include climate impacts as key considerations of business development (Wang et al., 
2012, p. 40; The Climate Group, 2013, p. 4). Investors are not very optimistic about the 
prospects of financial products linked to climate change. Commercial banks are at a stage of 
‘wait and see’ and have only recently set up rudimentary carbon asset management services 
and funds. Many of them do not possess the adequate knowledge and expertise in climate 
finance. Progress is slow in developing climate financial products, such as climate debentures 
and climate insurance.  
Carbon trading is a more specific area of climate finance that requires a functioning 
market to deliver efficient outcomes. The regulatory and policy environment is, again, the 
key determinant of success or failure. According to Adams (2013), the central government 
forbade Chinese banks and certain other financial institutions from getting involved in the 
CDM and appears reticent to allow them to participate in the China’s domestic carbon 
markets. Securities regulators do not view carbon trading as falling under the purview of 
‘finance’ and tend not to assume direct responsibility for regulating carbon markets (Adams, 
2013). Indeed, there has been ‘a culture of distrust in business’, limiting access of some 
corporations and financiers interested in carbon trading to the policy arenas (Wang, 2013, p. 
273). Carbon asset management firms, for instance, have no significant impact on the 
institutional development of Chinese voluntary carbon markets. Neither the central nor local 
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governments consider these firms indispensable components of domestic carbon trading 
systems (Huang, 2013).  
The market structure in its current form does not appear attractive to businesses and 
financial institutions. Few Chinese businesses take corporate social responsibility seriously 
and they have no legal obligations to curb their emissions. This leads to low demand for 
carbon credits and related financial services. On the supply side, Chinese carbon exchanges 
are currently only allowed to operate spot markets. Globally, these markets account for only 
a small share of the carbon trades, whereas futures markets dominate (Wang et al., 2012). For 
carbon trading to thrive, exchanges must have the capacity to allow derivatives trading and 
securities businesses, but the central government is reluctant to offer derivatives and 
securities because of risk-management concerns (Adams, 2013). As specified in a decree 
released in 2011 (State Council, 2011), special permissions are required for local exchanges 
to undertake these activities. The limited trading options are likely to discourage financial 
investors.   
 
4.3 Incomplete regulatory infrastructure 
Compliance carbon markets are regulation-driven. Under an ETS, firms are required to 
surrender emission permits for a given amount of emissions produced. Legislation is 
imperative to establishing the legal status of emission permits or allowances. Enforcement 
and punishment are required in the event of non-compliance or misconduct, where permits 
are not surrendered as stipulated, prescribed trading rules are violated, or data reporting is 
found to be misleading. Moreover, the number of permits a firm has to hold is assessed 
against available emissions data. An accurate and consistent system for measurement, 
monitoring, reporting and verification is essential to ensure effective regulation of firms 
covered by an ETS. 
China’s regulatory infrastructure for carbon trading is far from complete. There are 
considerable challenges in setting up robust monitoring, reporting and verification 
mechanisms, which remain current in Europe and more so in China, where legal enforcement 
is constantly a problem confronting all levels of the society. Currently, there are no national 
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regulations specifically for emission trading, and the on-going ETS programme proceeds as 
an administrative operation. While any assessment of regulatory performance in advance of 
the implementation of the pilot schemes is inevitably inconclusive, it is useful to review other 
relevant regulatory experiences as a reference point, such as the SO2 ETS. 
The notion of SO2 emission trading has been in China since the 1990s. Although local 
governments had set up regulations for the SO2 ETSs, the lack of transparency in actual 
regulatory practice remains a concern. Emission trading rules are not clearly articulated, and 
enterprises have little assurance that the trading arrangements could protect their rights as 
‘under-the-table’ negotiations and corruptions dominate (Tao & Mah, 2009). Market 
transparency is also limited due to the absence of an effective information management and 
disclosure system (Tao and Mah, 2009). Furthermore, the punitive mechanisms are poorly 
constructed; fines are too low to discourage non-compliance (Chang & Wang, 2010; Mol, 
2009). Violation for the second time is tolerated: a firm would not be fined twice for the 
same polluting activity in the event of non-compliance, consequently creating little 
motivation for buying or selling emission permits (Chang and Wang 2010). Locally there is 
strong political resistance to the enforcement of environmental laws, including those relating 
to emission caps that are thought to be detrimental to the economy (Liu & Xu, 2012; Zhang, 
2007). Bureaucrats generally have low motivation to consistently enforce legal provisions. 
Allocation of emission permits would be a source of faults if monitoring, reporting 
and verification mechanisms lack accuracy and consistency. This is the current situation in 
China, where official emissions data lack reliability (Zhang, 2011) and the current systems 
are predominantly based on self-reporting (Tao and Mah, 2009; Chang and Wang, 2010). 
Regulated firms prepare emissions reports themselves and are subject to occasional 
inspections by environmental agencies. They are only required to report fuel inputs and 
emissions are not monitored on a regular basis, if ever. Manipulation of emission data is not 
uncommon under some allocation methods (Tao and Mah, 2009). Permit allocation remains 
arbitrary in the absence of reliable information on which it is based. China is not known for 
effective legal enforcement and disclosure of sensitive environmental information (Mol, He, 
& Zhang, 2011). 
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4.4 Excessive state intervention 
The promise of economic efficiency relies upon the existence of a perfectly functioning 
market. A necessary condition for an ETS to work is that prices are allowed to fluctuate 
towards market equilibrium. The idealised setting is a free market economy in which prices 
are determined by market dynamic and not controlled by a single party. This economic 
assumption has lost validity in actual market settings (Spash & Lo, 2012). The European 
experience suggests that market power does exist and the power industry, often dominated by 
a handful of large corporations, has the ability to engage in activities such as mark-up pricing, 
price discrimination and manipulation (Spash & Lo, 2012).  
 The current situation of the power market in China has violated that assumption in a 
different dimension. Key economic policies are formulated by central authorities and state 
intervention continues to affect every aspect of economic life. In this country power prices 
are actively regulated by a central authority. Despite recent electricity market reforms, 
electricity prices remain under the central government’s control. The Department of Price, a 
subsidiary of the NDRC, is responsible for moderating the prices of key commodities, 
including electricity. Through its administrative arm the central government sets a specific 
price for almost every newly built generation plant since 1985 (Du, Mao, & Shi, 2009). 
There are large variations in the regulated prices between or even within plants. The 
regulation of wholesale electricity price proves to be ineffective (Du et al., 2009). Criteria for 
price control have been arbitrary.   
 Price control means that the carbon price under the ETS would reflect political 
judgement, rather than marginal cost of production. Regulated electricity companies would 
be prevented from passing the full cost to electricity users who are expected to adjust their 
power consumption in response to price signals, as the central government is highly 
concerned about the impacts of volatile prices on the economy, particularly the possibility of 
inflation under the carbon price (Wu, 2011). A World Bank report predicts that under a 
Chinese ETS which covers the power industry, the Department of Price would play a central 
role in managing the cost of carbon and its fluctuation (Kossoy and Guigon, 2012). The 
managed carbon price would effectively become a kind of carbon tax in co-existence with a 
cap-and-trade mechanism, in which both prices and emissions quantity are subject to some 
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form of state control. Prospects for economic efficiency are, however, uncertain (Sorrell and 
Sijm, 2003). 
 The regulatory experience with the Chinese SO2 ETS has demonstrated the limited 
scope for the market to operate free from arbitrary political manipulation. The SO2 emission 
trade prices are largely modulated or instructed by the state depending on the discretion of 
individual government officials (Tao and Mah, 2009). Emission trading transactions have 
been subject to administrative intervention. In some cases the government dominates the 
entire transaction process, including negotiation on trading price, trading volume and terms 
of permit ownership (Tao and Mah, 2009). Market competition has only recently come to 
existence in China’s regulated power sector in which political bargaining is prevalent. The 
legacy of planned economy has created distortions to the ETS. 
 Given the tremendous economic implications of GHG control, the central and local 
governments are tempted to execute the ‘visible hand’ by modulating prices as they do 
regularly to manage the economy. It is therefore uncertain as to how the power sector can be 
brought into the prospective ETS. Certainly some form of policy intervention is occasionally 
needed to manage residual risks and maintain market order, but the Chinese government has 
a history of regularly and intensively controlling the macro-economy through administrative 
means. Gilley (2012) has noted that a key element of China’s climate policy discourse is the 
extensive use of authoritative power. This governance tradition comes into conflict with the 
theoretical requirements for an emission trading regime to operate efficiently.  
 
5. Conclusions   
China has made efforts on emission reduction in the context of continuing economic 
development. The conditional commitment is evidenced by the declared preference for 
intensity targets and compatible economic mechanisms recently adopted. Carbon taxes could 
fit the domestic context, whereas domestic carbon trading in early stages lacked coordination 
and merely served to reap short-term benefits and improve public image without 
demonstrating major environmental achievements. However, carbon trading has proved to be 
politically more attractive. High-level coordination is underway and centrally approved ETSs 
17 
 
are up and running. Political resistance has softened; local emissions caps are being 
introduced and national caps are imaginable in medium term. The real challenges are, 
however, how the regulation-driven carbon market system works effectively with the state 
machinery which is not primarily designed to support such system.  
 China’s carbon markets operate in a unique political economic context that accounts 
for some of the structural barriers limiting their growth. This article has identified four main 
challenges to the carbon market development in China, namely, inadequate domestic demand, 
limited financial involvement, incomplete regulatory infrastructure and excessive 
government intervention. The first two concern economic dimensions. A key hurdle 
underlying these economic challenges is the absence of a nationwide emission cap. 
Nevertheless, Chinese state leaders appear to be increasingly aware of the potential benefits 
of active engagement in global carbon trading, as demonstrated by their approval of the pilot 
ETSs. There will be long-term benefits to the country if carbon trades eventually surpass the 
oil market and dominate the global market. In addition to mounting international pressures, 
the fact that China’s economic growth and energy demand have begun to slow down in 
recent years may also reduce political resistance to introducing binding emission limits at the 
national level.  
In this light, it is possible that some form of emission cap may come into existence in 
this country in the next ten years or so, creating demand for emission allowances and giving 
the necessary economic energy to the domestic carbon market. This can also address, at least 
partially, the problem of limited financial involvement. When regulated firms are required 
and motivated to curb emissions or purchase emission allowances or offsets, private financial 
institutions will become more willing to engage in the carbon market. Banks, financial 
intermediaries and consultancies will gain experience and capacity over time through pilot 
schemes and other private or public initiatives. Proper changes in policy arrangements can 
address the lack of demand and investment which creates impediments to market growth. 
Capping GHG emissions at the national level, in particular, will be an effective way for 
strengthening China’s carbon markets. 
 The other two challenges tend to be institutional and to arise from the unique political 
system of China, which operates as a ‘social market economy’. The lack of a robust 
18 
 
regulatory and legal framework, and the excess of government intervention are amongst the 
more intractable governance issues. Modest changes in governing practice have occurred 
through the tendency for decentralisation of environmental policy-making. However, some of 
the institutional barriers are rooted in the ways in which the larger system operates and 
maintains its legitimacy. For example, improving the regulatory and legal framework for 
GHG emission reporting will enhance transparency; but it may open up some sensitive 
energy security issues that the ruling regime has traditionally been very cautious about 
(official data on provincial and municipal GHG emissions are currently not open to public).  
Furthermore, the ability to exercise direct government intervention in the macro-
economy (e.g. moderating utility prices) proves to be important for the non-elected ruling 
regime to maintain economic and social stability in this country. Political efforts are required 
to address these deeply entrenched institutional barriers and redefine the role of the state. 
Although the ongoing ETS programme will introduce new institutional practices at various 
scales, the success of China’s carbon market reform crucially depends on the ability of these 
new institutions to transform the distorted state-market relationship. To strengthen the carbon 
markets, policy-makers should reconsider the role of macro-economic agencies, such as the 
Department of Price, and state ownership of big GHG emitters, notably oil companies.  
Further research is needed to ascertain how the state and the market interact to balance 
conflicting political and economic requirements. 
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